Central Asia faces acute water shortages. In order to address these more effectively water sharing arrangements that are based on the Soviet era agreements need to incorporate the impacts of climate change and changing water politics in Afghanistan, which could further exacerbate existing tensions in the region.
In recent weeks, entire neighbourhoods in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek, have lacked sufficient water to wash or drink. In Uzbekistan, a Presidential decree issued in April predicted a 20 percent reduction of the amount of water coming from the region’s main two rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, when compared to a multi-year average. While water shortages in Central Asia can to some degree be attributed to poor management and an increasing demand by a growing population, they are exacerbated by climate change through the shrinking of the glaciers feeding the region’s rivers and decreasing precipitation levels.
All Central Asian countries experience water shortages, and their problems are linked through the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Pressure on shared water resources has at times triggered disputes in the region. In 2012, Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that building hydroelectric power stations on upstream rivers in particular could spark war in the region, as these dams would leave countries downstream at their neighbours’ mercy for their water. However, in recent years the development of upstream dams has seen increased cooperation rather than conflict. This is especially visible in the cases of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan and the Kambarata-1 dam in Kyrgyzstan.
Soviet legacies
Under Soviet rule, water policy in Central Asia was centralized by Moscow and coordinated through a barter system. Upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supplied water for the agriculture sectors in downstream countries Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in summer. In return, the downstream countries provided the upstream countries with food and energy supplies, mostly gas, in winter. This allowed the upstream countries not to release water for hydropower production in winter but retain it for the growing season in summer instead.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fossil-fuel rich downstream countries were no longer obliged to deliver energy in return for the water from the upstream countries. As a result upstream countries accelerated their hydropower production during the cold winters. Suddenly downstream countries faced flooding in winter and a lack of water for agriculture in summer. To address these issues, the five Central Asian countries formed the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) through the 1992 Almaty Agreement. The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which is part of IFAS, is in charge of setting withdrawal limits for the upper riparian countries. Electricity sharing is done through Central Asia's unified grid, another legacy from the Soviet era. The barter system further continued through a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, coordination has at times failed, leading to water disputes between countries.
The Rogun Dam
Under Karimov, Uzbekistan particularly opposed the construction of the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan, located on the Vakshh river upstream of the Amu Darya flowing to Uzbekistan. Karimov was afraid upstream dams would leave Uzbekistan with a decreased amount of water available through the Amu Darya and exposed to flooding. Construction on the Rogun dam began in the 1980s and was relaunched by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in 2004, with the construction officially beginning in 2016. When fully completed, the Rogun dam is projected to be the tallest dam in the world at a height of 335 meters. For Rahmon the Rogun dam is also a prestige project, showcasing power and the capability to implement such a mega-project, boosting national pride.
Tajik-Uzbek relations improved when Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office as President of Uzbekistan in 20116, yet the Rogun dam long remained a taboo topic. Only recently Uzbekistan has become more constructive towards cooperation on upstream dams. The country has long struggled with persisting energy shortages and outages, at times paralysing the country. Hydropower from upstream dams could be the answer to these problems. As a result, the country became more positive towards the issue. In June 2022 this led to an agreement in which Uzbekistan committed to importing energy produced by the Rogun dam.
Dam’s potential melting away
Despite potential energy returns, investment in the Rogun dam remains an issue. The World Bank has estimated the total cost of the Rogun project at 4.8 billion US dollars, nearly half of Tajikistan’s GDP. Power production in Central Asia is generally not commercially viable, as governments are wary of hiking tariffs for consumers due to fears of social unrest. Moreover, as the glaciers feeding the Vaksh river shrink due to climate change, this will decrease the amount of water flowing to the Rogun dam and with it returns on dam investments.
However, over the last year Tajikistan attracted substantial investment in the Rogun dam. According to a spokesperson for the European Investment Bank in July 2022, the EU aims to become the largest investor in the Rogun dam, although the exact financial commitment remains unclear. In January 2023, the World Bank approved a grant of $65 million USD for the project, while the Islamic Development Bank in February 2023 pledged to invest $250 million USD in four infrastructure projects in Tajikistan, including Rogun. The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank followed with a $500 million soft loan in March 2023.
Two of the six turbines of the Rogun hydropower project are already finished, and the Italian company Webuild started the construction on the remaining four in July 2022. The six turbines together will have a capacity of 3.600MW, doubling Tajikistan’s energy production and potentially allowing it to increase energy exports to neighbouring countries.
Kambarata-1
A planned mega-dam in neighbouring Kygzystan has a history similar to the Rogun dam. Kyrgyzstan has long attempted to construct the Kambarata-1 dam on the Naryn river, a tributary of the Syr Darya. The intended capacity of Kambarata-1 is 1.860MW, which Kyrgyzstan hopes would turn the country from an energy importer into an exporter. The Kambarata-1 project was first planned 1986, but stalled due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. New attempts to construct the dam were made by Russian companies between 2008 and 2015, but failed to materialize.
Uzbekistan long opposed Kambarata-1 but has adopted a more positive stance under Mirziyoyev, as with Rogun. Despite continuing concerns over water volumes, Tashkent now sees the dam as a source of stability rather than a threat, as it could contribute towards Uzbek energy security. On 6 January 2023, the energy ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a roadmap outlining the construction of Kambarata-1, which is to be finished in 2028.
While Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed an investment agreement for the project in January 2023, Kazakhstan has refused to provide financial guarantees. Kyrgyzstan has persistently struggled to find funds for Kambarata-1, which has an estimated cost of almost 3 billion USD. Projected returns on investment are low due to low energy prices. The shrinking of the glaciers feeding the Naryn river will only decrease already low returns on investment. While Kyrgyzstan started construction at Kambarata-1 in June 2022 it lacks the funds to complete the project by itself, and currently the project is undergoing a revised feasibility study.
The construction of Kambarata-1 further poses questions over how this will affect the Toktogul dam, which is located downstream from Kambarata-1 on the Naryn river. While Toktogul currently provides around 40% of Kyrgyz electricity, Kyrgyzstan has struggled to fill the Toktogul reservoir due to low water levels. The reservoir created by Kambarata-1 is projected at 5.4 billion cubic metres, and filling this new reservoir would temporarily withhold water from downstream Toktogul. In the short run, this could decrease rather than increase Kyrgyzstan’s energy production.
Improved cooperation, decreasing returns
Regional water cooperation in Central Asia has improved significantly over the last years. This is mainly due to Uzbekistan’s more positive stance on water cooperation under President Mirziyoyev. The Rogun and Kambarata-1 dams can improve the region’s water and energy security when they allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to release water in summer while receiving energy from downstream countries in winter. However, financial obstacles remain. While the Rogun dam has attracted investment from various international organisations, this has so far not been the case with Kambarata-1. Returns on both projects will remain low when energy prices stay low and further decline when glaciers melt. Furthermore, Central Asia’s outdated unified electricity grid requires additional investments, to allow for continued energy sharing.
In the medium and long term, Central Asian water cooperation will come under further pressure not only through climate change, but also due to the Taliban’s construction of the 285km Qosh Tepe canal, through which Afghanistan will divert up to 10 billion cubic metres water annually from the Amu Darya. Future water cooperation in Central Asia will therefore somehow have to factor in both climate change and the role of Afghanistan, which is absent from current water sharing agreements that remain based on Soviet-era legacies.
Douwe van der Meer is living in Central Asia and previously worked as a research assistant at the Planetary Security Initiative